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BACKGROUND 
On 19 February, 1993 this Court entered a decision which 
overturned the Utah State Tax Commission's determination that 
Petitioner is responsible to pay sales taxes on materials which the 
Alpine School District purchased and Petitioner installed into a 
junior high school in Alpine School District. On 2 March 1993, the 
Respondent filed a Petition for Rehearing and requested this Court 
to reverse itself with respect to its decision. By letter dated 
18 March 1993, this Court has requested Petitioner to file a 
response to the Petition for Rehearing. 
ISSUE ON REHEARING 
Is the Court of Appeals Decision Wrong With Respect to 
Standard of Review, the Facts Upon Which it Relied for 
its Decision and the Appropriate Law Applicable to 
Determine This Matter? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Tax Commission has petitioned for rehearing on the grounds 
that the Court applied the wrong standard of review, misunderstands 
the law, and improperly overturned factual findings of the 
Commission. Like its original decision, however, the Tax 
Commission's Petition for Rehearing stems from a basic 
misunderstanding of the sales and use tax law. Moreover, the 
argument that the Court based its decision upon the wrong facts is 
clearly without merit because the Court relied upon facts 
stipulated to by both parties. Finally, the Court of Appeals 
correctly applied the "correction of error11 standard of review. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
REHEARING SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE 
COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE "CORRECTION OF 
ERROR" STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the "correction of 
error" standard of review because all of the Tax Commission's 
assessment of error arise from erroneous legal conclusions. First, 
the Tax Commission's assessments of error arise from 
misinterpretation of the tax statute. The Commission is in no 
better position than the Court of Appeals to construe the statute. 
As Respondent admits in its own brief, the Court must determine if 
the Commission's findings are appropriate "in light of the 
statutory setting in which it operates." (Petition for Rehearing 
at 3) . In reviewing such findings, the Court appropriately applied 
the correction of error standard which accords no deference to the 
Commission's reading of relevant statutes. Therefore, the Court 
applied the appropriate standard of review under Morton 
International Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Ut. 1992). 
The Commission's statement of the law set forth in Utah 
Department of Administrative Services, v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Ut. 1983) is misleading. The Respondent 
maintains that the "mixed questions of law or fact or the 
application of findings of basic fact to the legal rules governing 
the cases" always must be reviewed under the "reasonableness" 
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standard. However, the reasonableness standard is employed to 
review mixed questions of law and fact only when the application 
of fact to law involves a matter as to which the legislature 
expressly has given the Tax Commission discretion to interpret the 
statutory language. Chevron v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2 07 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 23, 24 (Utah Sup.Ct., January 29, 1993). As the Court 
stated in Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 at 
585: 
The correction of error standard was also used 
to review an agency's construction of, or 
application of findings of fact to, the statute 
to which the agency is empowered to administer 
- when the agency's experience or expertise is 
not helpful in resolving the issue. One 
example of such a situation is when a question 
of statutory interpretation turns on basic 
legislative intent. Other examples include 
situations where the agency is construing 
ordinary statutory terms within the statute 
which they administer, such as, application of 
limitation, under the Workman's Compensation 
Act, the proper construction of the term 
'deficiency of service.' In fact, in any 
situation involving the application of the 
legal rules to the findings of fact, a 
correction of error standard is used if the 
Court is as well suited to determine the issue 
as the agency. (emphasis added) 
The legislature has not given the Tax Commission any special 
charge to interpret the statutes in question. Further, the 
particular issue raised by the Tax Commission is not one which it 
is better suited to determine than the Court of Appeals — in fact 
This Memorandum addresses issues under current law 
because the Tax Commission's Petition has ignored the Court's 
proper finding that the law in effect on December 1985 governs this 
case. However, the conclusion is unchanged under the 1985 law. 
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the Tax Commission is decidedly less competent than this Court, 
The precise issue involves the legal effect of deductive change 
orders which remove all obligations to furnish materials from a 
furnish and install contract. The Tax Commission reached an 
erroneous legal conclusion that the Petitioner remained responsible 
for purchased materials notwithstanding the amendment to the 
contract by the deductive change order process. However, the 
Petitioner demonstrated in its Memoranda previously submitted to 
this Court that the Tax Commission's conclusion is legally 
erroneous. The Tax Commission is in no better position than the 
Court of Appeals to construe the statutes at issue or the effect 
of deductive change orders. 
II. 
REHEARING SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE 
COURT APPROPRIATELY STATED THE LAW 
A. In the Context of the Present Case, a "Transfer" Is Not 
a Taxable Event. 
The Court properly found that the mere "transfer" without a 
purchase is not a taxable event under the circumstances of the 
present case. The Respondent is correct that U.C.A. §59-12-
102(10)(e) refers to taxing "possession, operation or use" granted 
under a "lease or contract," which indicates that in general 
"transfers" could be subject to sales tax under some circumstances. 
However, when read in context it is clear that the phrase "lease 
or contract" must be read in para materia with "leases and rentals" 
referred to in §59-12-103(1)(k). The present case does not involve 
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any "lease and rentals" and therefore the language regarding a 
"lease or contract" in §59-12-102(10)(e) is irrelevant under the 
facts of the present case. Thus, in the context of the present 
case, the Court of Appeals is correct to hold that only events of 
purchase and not subsequent transfers are material to determination 
of responsibility for sales or use taxes. 
B. The Court of Appeals Findings Regarding the Use Tax are 
Correct 
The Tax Commission's second two arguments regarding a 
"critical area of law and the application of the use tax" and the 
"Commission's stated basis for imposing the tax" amount to nothing 
more than a complaint that the Court did not give adequate "time" 
to the Tax Commission's logic and argument. (Petition for 
Rehearing, pp. 4 - 7). However, the Court correctly noted that a 
use tax is totally inapplicable because the use tax can be assessed 
only against the purchaser and the Petitioner was not a purchaser. 
It was adequate for the Court to have found one dispositive flaw 
in the Tax Commission's argument — it need not find numerous 
flaws. It was not incumbent upon the Court to elaborate upon the 
Tax Commission's argument or to discuss alternative grounds which 
would have reached the same result, such as the inapplicability of 
use tax to extra-territorial sales as set forth in Geneva Steel 
Company v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 2d 208 (1949) , 
and Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
99 UAR 13, (Utah Nov. 6, 1992) or the requirement of ownership 
contained in the definition of "use" in §59-12-102(13) (a), U.C.A. 
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III. 
REHEARING SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE APPROPRIATE 
The Respondent's final assignment of error is a claim that the 
Court of Appeals improperly overturned factual findings of the 
Commission. There are at least three (3) errors in the Tax 
Commission's position which justify the Court of Appeals finding. 
First, the specific finding cited in the Tax Commission's Petition 
constitutes a legal conclusion as to the ultimate significance of 
the other findings and stipulations quoted in the Court of Appeals' 
opinion. Second, by citing the facts stipulated to by the parties, 
the Court of Appeals showed that adequate facts had indeed been 
marshalled to overturn the Tax Commission's ultimate findings. The 
facts stipulated to by the parties were clearly inconsistent with 
the ultimate findings by the Tax Commission. The Court of Appeals 
did not need to look further than the facts stipulated to by the 
parties as a basis for its decision. 
Finally, the actual legal issue on which this case turned was 
"who purchased the materials" not "who does the Tax Commission deem 
to be responsible to become the purchaser of the materials." Thus, 
the Tax Commission's erroneous findings about who had the duty to 
purchase the materials were not relevant to the critical question 
or final outcome of the case. The Court of Appeals was free to 
decide the case based upon the stipulated facts which had been 
properly marshalled without any obligation to specifically overrule 
contrary ultimate facts which were not directly relevant to the 
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decision on the correct question of law. Finally, since the Tax 
Commission reviewed the case based upon an erroneous understanding 
of the legal issues involved, its findings simply were not helpful 
or relevant to the Court of Appeals to make the correct 
determination. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Court of Appeals did not make an error in 
selecting the standard of review, its analysis of the law or in 
the facts, there is no reason to grant a rehearing, 
DATED this ^VfU day of March, 1993. 
Respectfully Submitted 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
V X A ^ 
Brinton'R. Burbidge 
Blake T. Ostler 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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